The Protection of Human Dignity (Article 1 of the Basic Law) by Benda, Ernst
SMU Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 2 Article 4
2000
The Protection of Human Dignity (Article 1 of the
Basic Law)
Ernst Benda
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ernst Benda, The Protection of Human Dignity (Article 1 of the Basic Law), 53 SMU L. Rev. 443 (2000)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol53/iss2/4
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY
(ARTICLE 1 OF THE BASIC LAW)
Ernst Benda*
"The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
duty of all public authority. "'
I. THE PRINCIPLE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE PAST
HE interpretation of Article 1 of the Basic Law (protection of
human dignity), in one of the most prestigious commentaries on
the German Basic Law-the five-volume "Maunz-Diirig"-was
written by Gtinter DUrig in 1959, over forty years ago. So far, it has never
been updated. The "Maunz-DUrig" is a loose-leaf publication which is-
sues partial updates twice a year. Somehow it failed, or found it unneces-
sary, to amend the comments on what is considered to be the central
provision of the Basic Law. DUrig died in 1996, and no one has provided
a more updated interpretation. Over forty years have passed since Ddrig
made his insightful interpretation, and since then, there have been count-
less efforts to interpret the clause on human dignity. We have the juris-
diction of the Federal Constitutional Court, but the most prominent book
on the Basic Law refers to an interpretation of another era. Drig, of
course, is still highly readable, but his viewpoint is that of the fifties, and
not of the end of our century. Modern problems such as privacy in the
electronic age, bio-ethics, gene-transfer, and cloning-fields in which the
reference to human dignity is now commonplace-did not exist then.
In 1985, when the Law Faculty at Tiibingen celebrated Drig's sixty-
fifth birthday, Graf Vitzthum pointed out that DUrig's "interpretation of
Article 1 GG is restrictive and no longer sufficient: Recent developments
affecting not only the already existing concrete person but potentially the
person per se, the human being in itself .... In the field of genetic engi-
neering we enter a territory in which the danger concerns not the individ-
ual and his dignity but the destruction of what is violable." 2 Vitzthum
called for a new dogmatic approach which, he said, would need a person-
ality "with the passion, status and dignity of Ginter Dnirig."
3
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This remark correctly points to the changing relevance of Article 1.
Until recently, it has been generally accepted that the principle of the
protection of human dignity deals with the concrete human individual, an
existing person whose dignity may be at risk. This does not apply to man-
kind as a whole.4 To be protected in one's dignity is, according to this
position, an individual fundamental right enforceable by a constitutional
complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court.5 DUrig denied that
fundamental-right character of Article 1, but the Constitutional Court
found otherwise. If we had to deal only with an aspirational, but ulti-
mately empty and unenforceable proclamation of a lofty ideal, no further
discussion would be necessary. But this has never been the position of
the Basic Law. When the Parliamentary Council, in discussing the new
West German Constitution, referred to the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948,6 it recognized the dif-
ference between an international law declaration and a constitutional
provision.7 The United Nations frequently refers to the principle of
human dignity. One recent example is the Unesco's "Universal Declara-
tion on the Human Genome and Human Rights" of November 1997. It
says, for instance, that "research [in this field] should fully respect human
dignity."8 Moreover, Section A deals with many applications of the prin-
ciple of human dignity to various aspects of the human genome. 9 All
these, no matter how noble, are general principles and non-binding decla-
rations. Article 1 of the Basic Law means much more than that. It guar-
antees protection of an individual's human dignity; it is both "the
supreme constitutional principle" and a fundamental right.10 Therefore,
it does not deal with an abstract idea of mankind, but with real men and
women. These are the people whose dignity needs protection, especially
4. See J.M. BOCHENSKI, DIE KOMMUNISTISCHE IDEOLOGIE UND DIE WORIE DES
MENSCHEN 19 (Bonn 1957); 1. VON MONCH (HRsG), GRUNDGESETZKOMMEN'rAR, Bd. 1
(Munchen 1981), Rdn. 8 zu art. 1; NII'PERDEY, GRUNDRECHTE BD. 15 (HRsG) v. NEU-
MANN/NIPPERDEY/SCHEUNER 3 (Berlin 1954); WILHELM WERTENBRAUCH, GRUNIXGESETZ
UND MENSCHENWORDE 24 (Koln/Berlin 1958); Wintrich, Zur Auslegung und Anwendung
des art. 2 Abs. 1 GG, STAAT UND BORGER, FESTSCHRIF' FOR W. APELr 1 (Munchen/
Berlin 1958) 2.
5. See ZIPPELIUS BK (fn. 4), Rdn. 24 ff. m. w. N.; WERNER KRAWIETZ, GEDACHTNISS-
CHRIFr F. KLEIN 245 (1977); STARCK ET AL., V. MANGOLDT/KLEIN/STARCK GG (n.2), art.
1, Rdn. 17 f.; 1. VON MONCH, 1. VON MONCH (HRsG), GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR 3 (Aufl.
1985), Rdn. 27 zu art. I GG; PODLECH AK (Fn. 2), Rdn. 61; BVerfGE 61,126 (137); ERNST
BENDA ET AL., HANDI3UCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREIPUBLIK DEUTSCH-
LAND 2 (Aufl. 1994), Rdn. 8; THEODOR MAUNZ, & GONTER DORIC, MAUNZ-DORIG,
GRUNDGESETZ (1959), art. 1, Rdn. 4.
6. See Protokoll des Ausschusses for Grundsatzfragen des Parl. Ameritarischet Rats,
v.18.11.1948 (22 Sitzung vom S. 2).
7. GG art. 1, § 2 ("The German people therefore uphold human rights as inviolable
and inalienable and as the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world.").
8. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Universal Decla-
ration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 29th Session (1997); see also UNESDOC
(visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ulis/cgi-bin/ulis.pl?database=gctd&sess=
29&by=5>; Towards a Declaration on the Human Genome (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://
www.unesco.org/ibc/uk/genome/index.html>.
9. See id.
10. BVerfGE 61, 126 (137).
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in this century of barbarism. Whatever the human being may lack in the
light of an idealistic concept and however imperfect he or she may be, his
dignity may not be denied. In Immanuel Kant's words: "Der Mensch ist
zwar unheilig genug, aber die Menschheit in seiner Person mu ihm heilig
sein.' "I I believe this means that by respecting everyone's dignity, we also
pay respect to the nature of mankind.
The Basic Law of 1949 was obviously an answer to the system of Na-
tional Socialism. On May 8, 1945, the Third Reich finally collapsed. Ger-
many was destroyed, defeated, and humiliated. Four years later, the
western part of the divided country, on orders of the occupation powers,
undertook the task of establishing a constitution. Since the Parliamen-
tary Council hoped for reunification in the near future, it intended to
create-as the Preamble of the Basic Law suggests-a new order for a
time of transition. However, by establishing the principle of protecting
human dignity at the very beginning, and making it the central guiding
principle of the Basic Law (unchangeable under the "eternity clause" of
Article 79, Section 3 GG even by a qualified majority), a much higher
claim was made. If one takes the principle laid down in Article 1 seri-
ously (there is no doubt that this is the purpose of the provision), and if it
is also the clear jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, then it is not an
idea for a period of transition, but a fundamental guideline for all times.
It could be abolished only by a revolution. Unification finally came,
much later than expected in 1949, and it was a complete surprise that it
was consequential to not give.up the fundamental law in favor of a new
constitution-as Article 146 GG provided for-but to have the former
GDR join the Basic Law under Article 23 GG.
The Parliamentary Council passed the Basic Law on May 8, 1949 (it
was officially proclaimed on May 23, 1949 after the state parliaments had
approved it). The date was no accident; the Council intentionally chose
this day to recall the unconditional surrender exactly four years earlier.
The meeting started at 3 p.m. and, as it turned out, it was near midnight
when a number of members still wanted to speak, and the final vote had
not been taken. Konrad Adenauer, the Council's president, asked every-
body to be as short as possible in order to get the vote on May 8th. A few
minutes before midnight, Adenauer proposed to take the vote first and
continue the discussion afterwards, and so it happened, and the Basic
Law was passed on May 8, 1949.12 Theodor Heuss referred to this date,
saying: "I am not sure how to grasp the symbolic meaning of this date.
This 8th of May, in essence, is the most tragic and questionable paradox
in our history. Why? Because we have, at the same time, been redeemed
and destroyed." 13
11. IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDGESETZ UND MENSCHENWORDE 24 (Wertenbrauch ed.,
1958).
12. See Parlamentarischer Rat, Sten. Ber. (10 Sitzung S. 139).
13. Id. at 136.
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This is the historical background of Article 1 GG, and of the entire new
constitution. This is essential for a correct understanding of the Basic
Law. At an earlier conference of the Dr~iger Foundation on the German
Basic Law, W. Cole Durham, in discussing the Basic Law from an Ameri-
can point of view, remarked on the influence of the different thoughts,
values, positions, and socio-economic structures, saying that similar ideas
can produce different cultural results. 14 Thus, he said, the meaning of
human dignity has a somewhat different understanding in the German
and in the American cultures:
In the USA, dignity is connected with self-confidence. If here one
talks about dignity, one example is the worker living close to poverty
but not prepared to accept public support. To treat everybody with
dignity means to help them and to respect them but not to under-
mine their self-confidence. In Germany the concept of dignity has
more to do with duty, the ideal of the moral law as seen in Kant's
philosophy. To take a more concrete example, in the USA, the right-
to-life discussion in the American abortion cases does not imply the
recollection of the Nazi atrocities as in the German abortion
controversy. ' 5
It is true that in this and other examples, the memory of the Nazi past
influences the general political discussion, as well as the Constitutional
Court jurisdiction. In one of its early decisions, in Volume 1 of the offi-
cial collection of the cases, the Court rejected the claim that the principle
of human dignity supports a right to social assistance for the needy:
If Article 1 states that the dignity of man is inviolable it intends only
a negative protection against attack. The second sentence,... it is
the obligation of all state authority to respect and to protect it does
oblige the state to the positive action of protection. This does not
mean, however, protection against material needs but protection
against attacks on the dignity by others, like humiliation, torture,
prosecution etc. .... 16
This obviously refers to the experience of the Nazi past. Only a later
jurisdiction acknowledged that human dignity can also be impaired by
material need, and that Article 1, therefore, gives everyone the claim to
at least the minimum standard of living depending on the generally ac-
cepted level.
In its decision of 1975 declaring the liberalization of abortion unconsti-
tutional, the Court said:
The Basic Law contains principles ... which can only be explained
by the historical experience and by the moral-ethical recollection of
the past system of National Socialism. The almighty totalitarian state
demanded limitless authority over all aspects of social life and, in
pursuing its goals, had no regard for individual life. In contrast to
this, the Basic Law established a value-oriented order which puts the
14. See W. Cole Durham, Eine Grundsatzliche Bewertung Aus Anerikanischer Sicht,
in DEUTSCHLAND UND SEIN GRUNDGESETZ 1993, at 63.
15. Id.
16. BVerfGE 1, 97 (104).
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individual and his dignity into the very center of all its provisions
.... The [Basic Law] demands the unconditional respect for every
life, however seemingly without "social value;" it is therefore incon-
ceivable to take this life without justifying reasons ... This does not
reflect in a derogatory way on other legal systems which did not have
the experience with an unjust system and which decided otherwise
on the basis of a different historical development and state-philo-
sophical conceptions.17
The dissenting opinion of two members of the Court sharply rejected
this argument. The dissenters pointed out that obviously Article 1 and
Article 2 (the right to life) were a reaction against the inhumane ideology
and practice of the Nazi regime. However, they said, it would be a com-
plete misunderstanding to derive from this a constitutional necessity to
prevent abortion by criminal law. On the contrary, the principal decision
of the Basic Law to distance itself from the totalitarian National Socialist
state should lead to a more cautious approach to criminal law, "the abuse
of which has led to unending suffering .in the history of mankind."' 8
Even today, more than fifty years after the end of the Nazi regime, this
experience still influences German constitutional thinking. But, as the
abortion case proves, different and contrary conclusions can be drawn
from it. Another example is the discussion on whether "history" teaches
that Germany should refrain from military actions as in the NATO Ko-
sovo situation, or on the contrary, whether one should conclude that
never again should deportation and "ethnic cleansing" be tolerated and,
therefore, military intervention is necessary if other means fail.
II. ADAPTING TO THE NECESSITIES OF OUR TIME
In the fifty years since the establishment of a new order in Germany,
the republic has developed into a stable modern democracy. It is a
respected country, a member of the United Nations, a partner in the
NATO alliance, and its democratic character and respect for the rule of
law has never been in doubt. The Basic Law is the binding guideline for
all state authority, including, of course, the central provision of Article 1.
Human dignity is respected not primarily because the Constitution de-
mands it, but because the political and social order provides the climate
and the cultural foundation which prevents any repetition of what hap-
pened before in our country and what unfortunately still happens in other
parts of the world. Of course, every country has to avoid being too over-
confident that "it could not happen here" or "it could not happen in our
time." One of the reasons why it did happen in Germany is that many of
the population's educated groups and classes (including a number who
became victims because of their optimism and their confidence that it
"could not happen here") believed that the existing high standard of civi-
lization and culture would prevent a totalitarian regime. But if anything
17. BVerfGE 39, 1 (67).
18. BVerfGE 39, 68 (76).
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can be predicted about an uncertain future, we can be fairly sure that the
democratic constitutional order established in 1949 will continue to be
stable and strong.
This means, in the context of Article 1, that the constitutional safe-
guards against the recurrence of acts of barbarism like those mentioned
by the Constitutional Court in Volume 1 are not obsolete, but there is no
actual need for them. To this extent, one might say that Article 1 deals
with virtual, but not actual dangers, and we can hope that this will be the
situation in the foreseeable future. Of course, offenses against the dignity
of man are still possible, and they happen, but they are not part of the
system as in the time of dictatorship. If they happen, the Constitutional
Court can be called upon by a constitutional complaint. In fact, in the
many instances of constitutional complaints-more than 100,000 com-
plaints have been made since the establishment of the Court in 1951-a
violation of Article 1 is claimed, often in combination with the alleged
violation of other fundamental rights. But only in very few cases did the
Court find that such claims had merit. The risk that the high principle of
protecting human dignity deteriorates into "small change," sometimes in
a more or less ridiculous context, is greater than the danger that any seri-
ous violation of the principle passes undetected, or without sanction. For
example, the Constitutional Court had to deal with the claim that the
changing of the official titles of judges from "Verwaltungsgericht-
sdirektoren" to the simpler and unified title "presiding judge at the ad-
ministration court" violated Article 1, because according to the claim, it
meant a "degradation."' 9 The Court also rejected the claim that a statute
providing for the obligation of certain traffic offenders to attend a traffic
instruction course, even if not necessary under the circumstances of the
case, violates human dignity.20 The Court also refused to find an obliga-
tion to bury the urn of a deceased person in a cemetery rather than in a
private garden. 21 Another example of such petty claims is the seriously
considered opinion in a law journal that it violates human dignity if one
has to obey traffic lights because human actions are regulated by a soul-
less automatic machine. 22 Many similar unfounded claims, sometimes
very close to the ridiculous, could be added. 23 If one compares these
petty cases with the historical origins of, and the reasons for, Article 1,
one would be relieved to find that problems of this kind are among the
most pressing concerns of our times.
This does not mean, however, that human dignity is not in danger, in
Germany or in any other country. Again, the historical developments,
the cultural diversity, and the principal value conceptions of a society
help to define the content and the borderlines of human dignity. This
19. See generally BVerfGE 1, 38.
20. See generally BVerfGE 22, 21.
21. See generally BVerfGE 50, 256.
22. See H. Schirrmacher, Gehorsam fur automatische Farbzeichen, DOV 146 (1957).
23. See I. v. MONCH, I. VON MONCH (HRsO), GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR Rdn. 4 zu
art. 1.
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applies even to societies which share a common cultural and religious
heritage, as in the case of the United States and Germany. While in the
United States the death penalty is under dispute but it is not considered
to be an offense against human dignity, the Basic Law abolished it in the
light of the Nazi experience.2 4 I share the opinion that even the qualified
majority for a constitutional amendment could not reestablish the death
penalty because Article 1 prohibits it,25 and because Article 1 demands
that every person convicted, even of a major crime, should be re-social-
ized if at all possible. The Constitutional Court upheld, under Article 1,
the obligatory life sentence in murder cases, but added the condition that
after a lengthy period of imprisonment there should be a review as to
whether the individual should be released, in light of the offender's per-
sonality and society's right to be protected against violent criminals.2 6
Clearly, this does not quite reflect public opinion. After a series of cases
against child murders, according to a public opinion poll last year, a ma-
jority of 55% demanded the death penalty's re-introduction. 27
Criminal law and criminal procedural law are major fields for the de-
fense of human dignity. These are the real test cases for a principle which
is easily applicable to people living up to the ideal concept of man digni-
fied by his ability to make a free ethical decision. This is one of the crite-
ria for the uniqueness of human beings and the foundation of their claim
to dignity.28 Any closer definition is difficult. According to Theodor
Heuss, the Basic Law thesis of human dignity is "not interpreted. '29 As
the philosopher Hans Jonas said, all we can achieve is the "Heuristik der
Furcht: Wir brauchen die Bedrohung des Menschenbildes, um uns im Er-
schrecken davor des wahren Menschenbildes zu versichern . . . Die
Erkennung des malum ist uns unendlich leichter als die des bonum. Was
wir nicht wollen, wissen wir viel eher als was wir wollen .... "30 And how
does one define the dignity of socially unadjusted persons, the mentally
insane, and the uncorrectable criminals? A more modest definition re-
stricts itself at least to the potential and abstract ability to live in dignity
and with responsibility. 31 The people most in danger are the racial or
religious minorities, the people living on the borderlines of society, and
the unadjusted. Under the dignity clause, even in hopeless cases, the
states should not pass the final verdict on anyone but must try, however
difficult it may seem, to save at least the remnant of dignity hidden in
24. See GG art. 102.
25. See PODLECH AK (n. 2) Rdn. 43; STARCK ET AL., V. MANGOLDT/KLEIN/STARCK
GG (n. 2) art. 1, Rdn. 29; A. ZIPPELIUS BK (n. 4) art. 1, Rdn. 70; ERNST BENDA (Anm. 3)
Rdn. 21.
26. See generally BVerfGE 45, 187.
27. See generally ZITELMANN, DIE WELT (1998).
28. See H.C. Nipperdey, Die Wtrde des Menschen, in NEUMANN/NIPPERDEY/
SCHEUNER, DIE GRUNDRECHTE BD. II (HRSG) 1954, at S. 1; THEODOR MAUNZ &
GONTER DORIG, GRUNDGESETZ (1959) art. 1 Rdn. 18.
29. VgI. Doemming/Flplein/Matz, Entstehungsgeschichte der Artikel des GG, 1 JOR
N.F. 49 (1951).
30. HANS JONAS, DAS PRINZIP VERANTWORTUNG 63 f (Frankfurt 1980).
31. See THEODOR MAUNZ & GONTER DURIG, GRUNDGESETZ (1959) art. 1 Rdn. 18.
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every human being. In practice, this affects the treatment of criminals or
of socially unstable or mentally ill people. Again, the conclusions are
somewhat different from the practice in the United States. Thus, accord-
ing to the Constitutional Court's and the Supreme Criminal Court's juris-
dictions, the lie detector and similar means of finding out the truth by the
forced cooperation of the accused, violate Article 1 and are therefore
prohibited, even if the accused person wishes to establish his innocence. 32
In the field of privacy, the American and the German concepts are in
much closer proximity. The modern state has the tendency to invade, to
an ever-expanding extent, into its citizens' personal affairs. To administer
problems of social security, taxing, or other fields affecting a large part of
the population, and to attend to individual justice which takes into con-
sideration the different personal aspects of each situation, the state needs
even more detailed information. The modern technology of the com-
puter age makes this possible. This means that all necessary information
can be brought together and collected in a very short time. Such informa-
tion, however, can also be abused. Data protection, therefore, is one of
the most urgent tasks of our day. The Constitutional Court has estab-
lished the principle that, under Article 1, everyone has the right to what
has been called "informational self-determination." The American term
"privacy" better expresses the right to protection of the individual private
sphere. The "right to be let alone" and the "right of the individual to
decide for himself, with only extraordinary exceptions in the interests of
society, when and on what terms his acts should be revealed to the gen-
eral public"' 33 are, according to the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, a
necessary consequence of the state's obligation to respect individual
dignity.
Of course, exceptions are unavoidable. If a modern state is to provide
the means of subsistence for people unable to live by their own efforts in
accordance with a minimum standard, it cannot avoid intruding into very
personal matters. The state, under Article 1, has this obligation. In par-
ticular, a social state cannot avoid the necessity to learn about its citizens
and their very personal matters. This is one of the dangers of the Euro-
pean-style welfare state, and it indicates one of the constitutional limits of
that type of state. The problem is how to draw the line between informa-
tion the state needs to fulfill its legitimate duties and the collection of
data which is unnecessary or too extensive. It also becomes important to
prevent information which may be legitimate for one agency from being
transferred to another without valid reasons. The information itself is not
32. See Vgl. schon E. Fechner, Zu den Gefahren der praefontalen Lobotomie und
Leukotomie im Bereich der Psychochirurgie, DIE SOZIOLOGISCHE GRENZE DER GRUN-
DRECHTE 15 (Amm. 6) (1954); THEODORE MAUNZ & GONTER DORIG, GRUNDGESETZ
(1959) (n. 4) art. 1, Rdn. 35, art. 2 Abs. 1, Rdn. 35 ff.; PODLECH AK (n. 2), art. 1 Abs. 1,
Rdn. 47; zum LOgendetektor BGHSt 5, 332; BVerfGE NJW 1982, 375; zurickhaltender
ZIPPELIUS, BK (n. 4), art. 1, Rdn. 86. Most recently, for more practical than constitutional
reasons, see BGH, F.A.Z. v. 18.12.1998, S. 13.
33. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 42 (1967).
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the main problem as long as it is necessary for a legitimate and clearly
defined purpose. The main problem is the "dysfunctional" information
which does not serve such a purpose and which can be transported
uncontrolled.34
The Constitutional Court's decision dealing with these principles
makes an important and more general observation. The Court notes that
if a citizen is uncertain about who knows detailed information about him,
he will become cautious, he will hesitate to exercise his citizen's rights,
and he will generally distrust the state. This impedes the individual's de-
velopment as a citizen, but it also works against the interests of the com-
munity: "Self-determination is a necessary functional precondition of a
liberal and democratic community depending on the ability of its citizens
to act and to participate in the public affairs."' 35 This is one of the foun-
dations of Article 1-free society depends on the freedom and dignity of
its citizens. The respect for human rights, as Article 1, section 2 says, is
"the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world." 36
III. ARTICLE 1-FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Under the conditions existing in 1949, the creators of the Basic Law
could not have foreseen the later developments in science which have
since changed the face of at least the developed countries. Computers,
genetics, bio-chemistry, and other fields open up new opportunities, and
at the same time, new risks to humanity. In political, social, economic,
and cultural spheres the world and Germany are completely different
from fifty years ago. When unification came in 1990, it was said that the
Basic Law, forty years old at that time, would be "too old" to serve as the
constitution of the united country. Political considerations aside, this was
the argument of Thomas Jefferson who wanted a new constitution every
twenty years. In the case of the United States Constitution, it could be
claimed that a 200-year old constitution created for a small rural society is
not quite the answer to the problems of the leading industrial power of
the 20th century. Still, continuity has its merits, creating, in particular, a
sense of history and tradition, and thereby the citizens' loyalty. But
changing circumstances need to be accommodated. If the constitution is
to answer the needs not only of the past but of the present and of the
future as well, it must be flexible. It should be able to adapt to the chang-
ing circumstances. The idea of "original intent" discussed in the United
States during the Reagan administration misunderstands the idea of the
Constitution as a "living organism." The Constitution, in the words of
Justice Brandeis, "is capable of growth, of expansion and of adaptation to
new conditions. Growth implies changes. . . .political, economic, and
social ... Because our Constitution possesses the capacity of adaptation,
34. See Ernst Benda, Privatsphdire und Persenlichkeitsprofil, FS GEIGER 37 (1974).
35. BVerfGE 65, 1 (43).
36. GG art. 1, § 2.
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it has endured as the fundamental law of an ever developing people. '37
The concept of human dignity necessarily claims universal validity, ap-
plying to every human being regardless of race, color, citizenship, or any
other factor. It also must claim validity in any time; it is either valid no
matter how circumstances may change, or it is not valid at all. Obviously,
Article 1 was the answer to the violations of human dignity known during
the time of the Nazi regime. These dangers do not exist anymore, at least
in principle, and hopefully they will not reappear. But new dangers exist
or may exist in the future. If the goal of protecting human dignity is still
valid, which the Basic Law claims for all eternity, 38 it is necessary to con-
sider future risks, and to react to them no matter whether the creators of
the Basic Law have, or could have, foreseen them in 1949. If the concept
is to function under the changing conditions, it has to adapt to the change
and has to realize the historical conditions under which human dignity
may be endangered. Thus, as the Constitutional Court said, "the judg-
ment on what conforms with the dignity of man depends on the current
state of insight; it cannot claim timeless validity."
It is true that the completely new questions concerning the manipula-
tion of human genes could not be foreseen when the Basic Law was writ-
ten, and the makers of the Constitution could not have realized the
problems the new techniques might pose in the light of Article 1. There-
fore, it was not their "original intent" to answer these problems. How-
ever, the conclusion that these are not constitutional questions at all but
have to be decided by the political bodies alone 39 is not correct. Article 1
intends protection against any form of danger to human dignity, and it
does not matter whether any particular form of danger existed in 1949.
But then we have to re-examine what the object of protection is in
Article 1. As mentioned in the beginning of this article, the opinion was
widely shared that Article 1 deals with real existing persons, not with an
abstract idea of what mankind is supposed to be. Article 24 of the
UNESCO's "Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights" of November 1997 invites the International Bioethics Committee
("IBC") to identify "practices that could be contrary to human dignity,
such as germ-line interventions. '40 More explicitly, the Declaration de-
clares in Article 11 that "practices which are contrary to human dignity,
such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted."'41
These are two of the new questions of human genetics which are widely
discussed in many countries, and it is remarkable that, after a very inten-
37. Zit. nach WALTER HALLER, SUPREME COURT UND POLITIK IN DEN USA 11 (Bern
1972).
38. GG art. 79, § 3.
39. ZIPPELIUS, BK, art. 1, Rdn. 78.
40. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Universal Decla-
ration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 29th Sess. (1997); see also UNESDOC(visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ulis/cgi-bin/ulis.pl?database=gctd&sess=
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sive and controversial discussion, a consensus on these problems could be
achieved among the representatives of almost every country in the world.
The non-binding declaration appeals to the member countries to develop
legislation aligned with this position. In Germany, such legislation has
existed since 1990.42 New developments, particularly in the field of clon-
ing, indicate that these are not science fiction scenarios, but are clear and
present dangers threatening not so much any individual, but the future of
mankind as a whole. Apparently, the temptation exists to "improve" the
less-than-perfect human being. But the object of such manipulation, and
therefore the object of protection, is not an abstract notion of what
should define human beings in the future, human "Dollys," or different,
individual personalities. In trying to protect the human nature with all its
imperfections,43 our legislation takes Article 1 seriously. It protects not
only a vague idea; it protects future generations which have a right not to
be the product of social and genetic engineering, or cloned copies of
somebody else, but to be individual personalities, with all their weak-
nesses and imperfections.
To some scientists, these seem to be completely naive, old-fashioned
ideas not consistent with modern times, and are fruitless efforts to stop
what is considered to be the inevitable progress of mankind, the speed
and direction of which will be decided not by political bodies or by some
out-of-date constitutional lawyers, but by science and its disciples. In
other countries, notably in the United States, Canada and Australia, the
reluctance to go full-speed into whatever seems possible from a techno-
logical point of view seems blatantly reactionary. We share the same cul-
tural heritage, come from the same religious beliefs, and have, on the
whole, similar conditions in our political and social scene. Yet after at-
tending a number of international conferences on questions like those
connected with human genetics, one has to conclude, hesitantly, that
there is not really a common concept of what dignity of man means, even
though this is the subject of countless international resolutions and decla-
rations. It is not surprising that authoritarian regimes, even those who
signed the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights in
1948, have, at least in their practice and often in their ideology, quite
different concepts of human dignity. For instance, they may point more
to group rights, and refer to social needs more than to the individual fun-
damental rights which we take seriously, and generally agree upon. Yet,
when talking about human dignity, this quite often has a different mean-
ing even in the countries of the western world. This may be understanda-
ble in light of our respective history and present cultural and social
conditions. It is comparatively easy to agree on the necessary defense of
individual rights against the oppressions so familiar in this century, and in
42. Embryonenschutzgesetz, v. 13.12.1990 (BGB1. I S. 2746).
43. See Frnst Benda, Erprobung der Menschenwurde am Beispiel der Humangenetik,
AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE 35 B 3 (1985); Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Die Men-
schenwiirde als Verfassungsbegriff, 1985 JZ 201, 208.
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particular, so frequent and bitter in Europe only a few years ago, and
even today. But to understand and to agree on what are the limits of the
seemingly "humane" means of improving man and mankind as a whole,
this will be the main battlefield of human dignity in the future. We
should make a serious effort to begin forming a consensus on this. It will
not be easy, but we should begin it now.
